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Students on trial for 'defaming' President 
Twenty-one students who participated in a demonstration in front of Parliament on 14 December went 
on trial in J aka rt a for insulting the president. The 1 akarta district court divided the defendants into 
three groups. More than 1, 000 people attended the first session and in many universities students held 
rallies in support of their colleagues. 
The 21 students took part in a large demonstration under 
the banner of F AMI, Action Front of Indonesian Students, 
demanding that the government accept responsibility for 
violent incidents such as Haur Koneng, Nipah and Santa 
Cruz which resulted in many deaths. Their banners read: 
"Drag Suharto before an extraordinary session of the 
People's Congress", "Where is the President's responsi-
bility?", "Drag corrupt officials to court", etc. 
They are being charged under Article 134 of the Criminal 
Code for insulting the president, for circulating writings or 
pamphlets defaming the president (Article 137) and insult-
ing the authority of the state (Article 207). 
Three groups 
The defendants have been divided into three groups, 
according to their alleged degree of involvement. The first 
group of four persons are the 'most culpable' the so-called 
masterminds of the demonstration. The second group of six 
are charged with actively taking part in the demonstration 
and consciously defaming the president. The other eleven 
face the same charges, but their involvement is deemed to 
have been of a lower order. Nineteen of the defendants are 
being held in Salemba Prison while the two women are 
detained in Pondok Bambu prison. 
The Legal Aid Bureau, LBH, is in charge of the defence 
and has prepared three teams, altogether 54 lawyers headed 
by Adnan Buyung Nasution. Several well-known lawyers 
are in the team including Luhut Pangaribuan, Frans Hendra 
Winarta, Abdul Hakim G.N. and Rita Serena Kalibonso. 
The team is known as the Defence Team for the Pro-
Democracy students. The first of the trials started on 8 
March. They are expected to continue for several weeks. 
Many expert witnesses will appear in support of the 
students, including Ali Sadikin, Emha Ainun Nadib and 
Ariel Heryanto. 
Student opposition 
Student protest has grown markedly since last year, not 
least because of many attacks by the military against 
evicted peasants or workers on strike, resulting in bloodshed 
and deaths. FAM/, the Indonesian Student Action Front, 
became an umbrella organisations dealing with these 
national issues. 
Students from many islands, Java, Bali, Lombok, Sumatra 
and Sulawesi took part in the 14 December demonstration. 
The arrest of the 21 gave FAM/ students new impetus. 
Action groups came into being in support of the 21: 
KAMJM (Red Jacket Student Action Committee) in Suraba-
ya, SMURF (Solidarity with our FAMI Colleagues) in 
Jember, KPMD (Student Group in Favour of Democracy), 
and· so on. On the day of the trial thousands of students in 
Surabaya, Jember, Mataram, Yogya and Jakarta demon-
strated in support of the 21. 
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Trial proceedings 
The 21 students are: Yeni Damayanti, Masduki, Hendrik 
Sirait and Adi Kumiawan in the first group; Ferry Haryono 
Machus, Andi Hartono, Andrianto, Tony Sinaga, Saef 
Lukman, M. Yunus bin Kuslim, Piryadi, Munasir Huda, 
M.Farid Rasyad, Teddy Wibisono, and Sunandar in the 
second group. The third group consists of Suwito, B.M.Sri-
mardiana, Gunardi, Antony Ratag, Rifki Kholid and Wandi 
Tutuorong. They come from Surabaya, Malang, Jombang, 
Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Bogor. 
Yeni Damayanti (right) in the Pondok Bambu prison during 
visiting hours. Jakarta Post, 16 March 1994 
Right from the start there was a friction between the 
judges and the defence. The public gallery was packed and 
restless and the crowd often responded loudly. When a 
judge asked the defendants for their professions, the public 
shouted: "The enemy, we are the enemy. ' After the pros-
ecutor read the indictment, the defendants answered in 
chorus that they did not comprehend the charges. 
In the trial of the 11, Chief Judge Hutagalung decided to 
allow the defendants to read out their own eksepsi 
(demurrer). Teddy Wibisono, a student from Pakuan 
University in Bogor delivered a strong speech: "The 
prosecution has apparently only looked at what was written 
on the posters and has drawn the conclusion that the 
students organised in the Indonesian Action Front (FAM/) 
defamed the good name of the head of state. But why 
doesn't the prosecution have the courage to accuse the 
government or head of state of being responsible for the 
Nipah case, the Dili case, the Lampung case and many 
others. Don't think that by punishing us, the struggle will 
die down. The struggle will continue.' This was greeted 
with a roar of approval from inside and also from the crowd 
outside listening to the proceedings through a loud-speaker. 
The prosecution objected and asked the court not to allow 
the defendant to continue because the eksepsi was a 
political speech. But the defendant was allowed to continue. 
Piryadi bin Kartodihardjo argued that the prosecution was 
functioning as an extension of the power structure. Why 
doesn't the person who feels offended, the president, come 
here to argue his own case? Piryadi doubted whether the 
president would charge the defendants with insulting him. 
In similar style others refuted the charges of insulting the 
president. Saef Lukman from Cianjur started his demurrer 
by citing from the Holy Qur'an and argued that the demon-
stration in front of parliament was merely conveying 
people's aspiration to members of parliament. 'What ki~ of 
person am I if I keep quiet, watching people's suffering? 
What kind of person am I if I see the suffering of the feople 
at Nipah and stand idle. What kind of person am I VI see 
the collusion between officials and businessmen which has 
inflicted damage of 1. 3 trillion rupiahs on the state? Seeing 
all these injustices is what made me attend the demon-
stration.' 
The security approach 
In a separate trial against the four 'most culpable', Yeni 
Damayanti gave a powerful demurrer which touched the 
emotions of the public. Yeni, a long-time activist who has 
frequently been jailed for her views, questioned the defini-
tion of the word 'defamation'. She argued: '/don't think that 
saying "ABRI do not hurt the people is defaming anyone".' 
She insisted that the demonstration was not intended to 
insult the president. What is happening is deliberate 
political distortion. She attacked the use by the army of the 
security approach which has been the cause of so much 
bloodshed. The intervention of the security forces in civilian 
affairs was also strongly attacked by Yeni. 
As in other political trials the defence team will chaJJenge 
the legitimacy of the BAP accounts, the statements made 
and signed by the accused or witnesses during interrogation. 
In practically all cases BAP statements are made under 
duress. It is a widely recognised fact that political trials in 
Indonesia fail to meet international standards of fairness.>} 
continued from page 12 
Timor. It is also a mark of the lack of academic freedom 
and the freedom of expression in Indonesia. Readers 
wishing to oppos~ moves by his university to oust him can 
fax the rector on +62-298 81420 or at UKSW, J1 Dipone-
goro 52-60 Salatiga 50711. George can also be reached at 
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Basic rights on trial 
The law courts are being used increasingly these days to deal with pro-democracy activists. The 
authorities may think that relying on 'due process' will placate their critics abroad. But the trials are 
blatantly unfair. The strategy means criminalising political activity and denying freedom of speech. It 
relies on the Indonesian judiciary which is notorious for its obsequious collusion with the authorities. 
A mockery of justice 
The first to be tried in the latest waves of trials was Nuku 
Soleiman, 29 years. He was charged with insulting the head 
of state, having allegedly produced and distributed a sticker 
with the words Suharto Dalang Segala Bencana, or 'Su-
harto is the mastermind of all disasters'. 'Disasters' referred 
a number of massacres since 1984 for which President 
Suharto should be held personally responsible. The initials 
were taken from the name of the state lottery which was 
halted last November after widespread protest. 
Nuku is a university student and chair of the Pijar 
Foundation, an independent human rights organisation [see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No. 121, February 1994). This is not his 
first experience of imprisonment. He was held in 1989 for 
protesting against an increase in the price of electricity. 
He was arrested on 25 November last year and formaJJy 
charged on 14 January. After a mockery of a trial, he was 
given a four-year sentence. 
The court sessions were marked by an atmosphere of 
intimidation, with armed security officers surrounding the 
building and exercising control over those wanting to enter 
the courtroom. Inside, the courtroom was teeming with 
Nuku Soleiman in courl Jak.Post 25 Febr. 1994 
police and security officers. 
The trial drew large crowds and almost every session was 
marked by bitter rows between the defendant or his team of 
lawyers and the judges. 
The defence did not base their case on answering the 
charges in the indictment. Instead they focused on con-
demning the law used against Nuku and on defending the 
right to free speech. Article 134 of the Criminal Code 
which was used against Nuku was inherited from a Jaw 
enacted by the Dutch colonial administration in the early 
1900s and incorporated into Indonesian Jaw after indepen-
dence in 1949. It carries a maximum sentence of six years. 
It is widely condemned as a relic of the colonial era. 
A defiant defendant 
Nuku who was defiant throughout the trial, frequently 
express contempt for what he knew would not be a fair 
trial. His main statement in court came in the form of an 
eksepsi or demurrer, chaJlenging the legal grounds of his 
indictment. He opened with a poem by Emha Ainun 
Najib which, he said, would help the court understand the 
context of his defence. 
Isn't it amazing 
How the people in that country 
Have such a strong personality 
That even when their Jives have been destroyed 
They keep smiling, accepting their fate. 
The angels sigh 
Resigning yourself to your fate 
Is a wondrous thing, 
But quite out of place there 
Before he could proceed any further, the prosecutor rose to 
protest that this showed disrespect for the court and he 
should not be allowe~. to continue. When the judges agreed, 
his defence lawyers challenged the ruling and insisted on 
his right to speak. After a heated debate, with Nuku 
insisting that he would not exclude a single word from his 
statement, he was allowed to continue without interruption. 
Nuku said there was no difference between his statement 
that Suharto masterminded all disasters and Suharto's charge 
that the Indonesian communist party was the mastermind of 
the student movement. 'This is what makes political life 
dynamic, when there is interplay between political actors. 
Suharto is a political actor, just like me. The difference is, 
he governs and I am governed.' 
Intimidation in the courtroom 
He then complained of an atmosphere of terror. Most of 
those in court were not members of the public but security 
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officers in plain clothes. This show of force proved that the 
court was not free from control and intervention. 'As the 
proceedings started, a team of police carrying rattan sticks 
and truncheons marched in even though there was no hint 
of any disturbance.' [Jawa Pos, 25.1.1994) 
In a later hearing, Nuku became involved in another 
argument with the judge and refused to sit down when 
ordered. 'I'm not a buffalo to be ordered about,' he said, 
whereupon the judge ordered his removal from court. 
Before being led away, he shouted: 'Why don't you just 
sentence me to death?' [Jakarta Post, 8.2.1994) 
Defence witnesses rejected 
The most flagrant evidence of the bias of the court was its 
refusal to allow defence witnesses to appear. They included 
well-known intellectuals who would have testified about 
the vocabulary of political discourse and other aspects of 
freedom of expression. Altogether 17 defence witnesses 
were due to appear, two fewer that the prosecution's 19 
witnesses, but the court announced that all 17 defence 
witnesses would not be allowed because their evidence was 
'not relevant'. 
Even while the court was rejecting the witnesses, the first 
one, Ali Sadikin, former governor of Jakarta and a member 
of the dissident Petition-of-50 group, had taken his seat in 
the witness stand. A dispute over his eligibility to testify 
raged for more than an hour, with the judges claiming he 
could not be accepted as an expert witness as he was not an 
academic. One of the judges even had the effrontery to say: 
This court does not need any experts because we know 
everything that is linked to this case.' 
Sadikin reminded the court that he had been allowed to 
testify for the defence in several trials during the 1980s. 
Although Sadikin did eventually get a chance to speak, all 
the others were prevented from appearing. This led to. a 
walk-out by the defence team. They insisted that the tnal 
should not continue pending a ruling from the Supreme 
Court. 
Ignoring these objections, the next session moved on to 
next stage, the prosecutor's summing-up, even though the 
defence had not been allowed to present their case. From 
this point on, the defence lawyers refused to participate in 
the proceedings and Nuku refused to say another word. 
There was no defence statement from either the lawyers or 
Nuku. 
Rebutting charges that they had acted in contempt of 
court, the lawyers said outside the court after sentence had 
been passed that they had acted in the best interests of their 
client. As for Nuku, he was contemptuous of the whole 
proceedings. 'I knew from the start that I would not get a 
fair trial. I was robbed of my right, under the Jaw, to call 
witnesses for the defence.' [Editor, 10.3.1994) 
Amnesty calls for Nuku' s release 
In a statement issued the day after Nuku was sentenced, · 
Amnesty International called for the immediate and uncon-
ditional release of Nuku Soleiman. Denouncing the trial as 
a show-trial which failed to meet international standards of 
fairness, AI said Nuku was a prisoner of conscience, 
detained solely for the peaceful exercise of his right to free 
speech as guaranteed under international law and the 
Indonesian Constitution. 
Asia Watch condemned the Nuku verdict as 'utterly 
unjustified'. Executive Director Sidney Jones said: "Nuku 
Soleiman has been locked up for four years for the use of 
four words that could not have injured anyone. By imposing 
such a harsh sen1ence, the Indonesian government not only 
violates the right to freedom of expression, but it also stifles 
intellectual liveliness. If the government wishes to be seen 
as open, it has got to allow political dissent. ' 1c 
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First nationwide strike wins support on factory floor 
For the first time since the military seized power in 1965, workers in factories across the country 
responded to a strike call from an independent trade union federation, the Indonesian Prosperity Trade 
Union, SBSl According to the SBSI, 750,000 workers took part in the one-hour stoppage. 
The action went ahead despite the round- up of three SBSI 
leaders in Central Java on the eve of the strike which had 
been called for 11 February. More than a dozen union 
activists in Tangerang, West Java were arrested. 
Local strikes have been a daily occurrence in many parts 
of the country for several years. Whereas it appeared earlier 
that the strikes broke out more or less spontaneously, the 
emergence of the SBSI has begun to give some cohesion to 
the actions of workers. The union was set up two years ago 
and has avoided open confrontation with the government. 
But its existence challenges the government's insistence that 
there is place for only one union, the SPSI which is under 
the thumb of the authorities and mistrusted by the workers. 
Its very existence has placed the issue of freedom of 
association firmly on the political agenda. 
The SBSI strike call went out in late January in support 
of two demands: 
* The immediate repeal of a ministerial decree issued on 17 
January 1994 by Manpower Minister Abdul Latief, re-
asserting that the government-backed union, the SPSI, has 
the sole right to represent workers nationally and at the 
Muchtar Pakpahan, Editor 24 febr. 1994 
factory level. 
*The immediate adoption of a minimum wage of Rp 7,000 
- about $3.00 - a day for all workers, which is nearly 
twice the minimum wage of Rp 3,800 fixed by the govern-
ment in December. 
The ministerial decree of 17 Jan11ary came two weeks 
after the same minister issued a decision giving workers the 
right to set up unions outside the SPSI. The appearance of 
the two contradictory decisions was inexplicable, said the 
SBSI chair, Muchtar Pakpahan, unless it was the minister's 
deliberate intention to sow confusion. 
A test of strength 
Muchtar Pakpahan refuted claims that the strike was a 
failure because it did not result in a halt in economic 
activity or the stoppage of public transport. Our instructions 
to the members were simply to down tools at their respect-
ive places of work for a period of one hour. 'Indeed, 
nothing could be seen from the outside. Journalists would 
not have seen an)1thing either. We at the union know best 
what happened and we have no intention of entering into a 
debate with anyone about whether or not it was a success. 
Workers phoned in to the union after the strike,' said 
Pakpahan. 
He said that a similar action would take place again on 4 
April which the union felt sure would have the support of 
three quarters of a million workers. The February action 
was only intended as a test of the union's support. 'We 
wanted to show that the SBSI is legal and that it has 
supporters.' [Editor, 24.2.1994] 
SBSI leader to go on trial 
At least nineteen SBSI organisers were arrested on the eve 
of the strike. On 9 February, Muchtar Pakpahan, the 
national chair, Sunarty, a member of the union's executive 
council, and Trisjanto, chair of the union's Central Java 
executive council, were arrested in Semarang, Central Java. 
They were attending a meeting of some 40 activists which 
the authorities said was illegal. 
During the two days prior to the strike, four SBSI 
organisers in Bekasi, West Java, were summoned by the 
police for interrogation in connection with the strike, while 
on 10 February, twelve union officials and members were 
detained at the union's office in Tangerang and taken to the 
local military command. 
As far as is known, all SBSI officials were released soon 
after the strike but it has since been announced that Pakpa-
han is to be charged and tried, apparently for holding an 
'illegal meeting' and for 'sowing hatred in the community'. 
Having proved unable to halt the growth of the SBSI, the 
security authorities are trying to terrorise and intimidate 
workers by means of constant harassment, sackings and the 
detention - usually short-term - of local union activists. 
There have been numerous incidents of harassment since 
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* When an SBSI branch leader in Jombang, East Java tried 
to renew his identity card in July and then in October and 
December last year, he was told that his card would not be 
renewed unless he resigned from the union. An identity 
card is critical for everything, from applying for a job to 
getting married or opening a bank account. 
* In November 1993, a union official in Pematang Siantar, 
North Sumatra, was warned by military officers to resign 
from the union. 
* On 27 December, an SBSI commisariat was inaugurated 
at a factory in Bandar Lampung, South Sumatra ~here 600 
workers h1ve joined. The union announced the exIStence of 
the commisariat to the management on 4 January; the same 
afternoon, eleven union members were sacked. 
* Three soldiers appeared at the union's head office in 
Jakarta on 6 January as Pakpahan was holding a meeting 
with representatives of the Asian-American Free Labour 
Institute and the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Workers. The soldiers kept the meeting under 
surveillance. [Asia Watch, Indonesia: New Developments on 
Labour Rights, 24 January 1994] )} 
Strikes threaten the cheap-labour economy 
In the past few months, workers in many sectors of industry have gone on strike in support of demands 
for a decent wage. The pressure on employers has spread from the industrial regions in the vicinity 
of Jakarta known as Jabotabek, to other cities and provinces. Some foreign banks have been paralysed 
by strikes. Even hospital nurses, always wary about work stoppages for fear of harming their patients, 
have felt compelled to use the strike weapon. 
It is not difficult to understand why. The rapid expansion of 
manufacturing industry since the mid-1980s has been made 
possible because of cheap Jabour. Labour costs are lower in 
Indonesia than in any other country in Asia undergoing an 
industrialisation explosion.[see table opposite]. 
Textiles, garments, footwear, toys and dolls, and elec-
tronic goods, have become a major source of foreign 
exchange for the Indonesian economy. Workers have begun 
to realise that most of what they produce is for export, as 
the 'Made 'in Indonesia' label is becoming widely known in 
many western markets. In 1992, textile exports were worth 
$4.2 billion and garments were worth $3.42 billion. Foot-
wear, much of it for Reebok and Nike, was worth $1.61 
billion, electronic goods $760 millions and children's toys, 
$125 million. (See Hendardi, 'The Minimum Wage and the 
Month of Strikes' in Republika, 12.2.1994) 
Meanwhile, the level of exploitation has intensified. 
Labour productivity in the manufacturing industry sector 
grew by 6.6 per cent per annum from 1985 to 1990 while 
wages grew by only 2.6 per cent. In the textile and gar-
ments industry where so much cheap labour is employed, 
labour productivity improved by 9 per cent per annum in 
the same period, as compared with a 2.5 per cent annual 
increase in wages. (Sinar, 21.2.1994, quoting a study by 
Anggito Abimanyu]. Of the $79 paid by the consumer for 
a pair of Reebok shoes, labour accounts for a mere $1 (see 
separate item on page 9). 
A number of studies have shown that wages account tor 
at most 9 per cent of the total costs of a manufacturing 
company. Three times as much is 'spirited' away in what 
labour activists call 'uang siluman'. This includes bribes to 
local officials for licences, smear money to obtain bank 
credit, compulsory contributions to government-sponsored 
events and hospitality and 'welcoming ceremonies' for 
visiting officials. According to SBSI leader Muchtar 
Pakpahan, uang siluman accounts for between 25 and 30 
per cent of a company's costs. [Tempo, 12.3.1994) Com-
panies are often also required to pay a levy to the local 
military command for 'services rendered', which usually 
12.000 workers in Solo on strike 
means intervention to keep the workers in check. 
'A month of strikes' 
In January this year, there were no fewer than 47 strikes, 
involving 38,120 workers in the Jabotabek (Jakarta-Bogor-
Tangerang-Bekasi) region and Bandung alone. On a single 
day, 11,000 workers took action for higher wages in seven 
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factories in Tangerang, while 5 strikes broke out in nearby 
Bekasi on 11 January. 
Workers were in many cases responding to the Manpower 
Minister's announcement raising the minimum daily wage 
for the industrial regions of West Java from Rp 3,100 to Rp 
3,800 ($1.90) from 1 January. Companies which fail to 
comply will be fined the princely sum of Rp 100,000, little 
more than what most workers earn in a month. The higher 
rate is still far below the basic needs for a working class 
family. To highlight the discrepancy, the SBSI's strike call 
in ~ebruary included a demand for Rp 7,000 ($3,50) a day 
which, by any standards, is still very low. 
In some cases, the striking workers simply down tools and 
squat on the company's premises, In others, they unfurl 
posters and listen to speeches or the recitation of poetry. 
One of the largest and longest strikes in Tangerang was at 
PT Nagasakti Paramashoes Indonesia which manufactures 
footwear for Nike. The workforce of 6,700, mostly ·women, 
w~r~ angry; although the company had agreed to pay the 
m101mum rate of Rp 3,800 a day, payments for transport 
and food had been withdrawn with the result that take-
home pay had not increased. [Pelita, 18.1.1994] 
In other cases, strikes have turned into a huge public rally. 
In February, 12,000 workers at Batik Keris and PT Dan 
Liris, two batik factories in Solo, Central Java, went on 
strike to demand three years backpay for overtime. (The 
President's wife has a controlling interest in one of these 
companies.) The strike coincided with a visit to the city by 
Manpower Minister, Abdul Latief so the workers organised 
a huge march six kilometres long. 'We have been cheated 
of Rp 15,000 a month unpaid overtime for three years,' said 
one worker. One banner read: 'Stop using force. Pay us our 
overtime money. Continue Marsinah's struggle!' 
In Cimahi, Bandung, West Java, thousands of workers at 
a textile factory, PT Kahatex, vented their anger with their 
bosses by throwing bricks at the offices and overturning 
and burning company cars. [Tempo, 12.2.1994] 
At Ria Star Indonesia, a plastic goods factory in Sura-
baya, East Java, hundreds of women organised a one-day 
lock-in to protest at being forced to remove their panties to 
prove · they are menstruating so as to get the two-day paid 
leave to which they are entitled under Indonesian law. They 
were also demanding higher wages, a transport allowance 
and payment of the 1993 Ramadhan allowance still owed 
by the company. On the very same day, there were strikes 
at five other factories in Surabaya. [Jawa Pos, 10.2.1994] 
January has been called 'a month of strikes' but as events 
unfold, it is clear that unrest in the industrial sector is not 
a one-month wonder. As working-class consciousness 
deepens, 1994 seems set to become a year of challenge to 
an economy largely subsidised by low-paid workers who 
until now have been held in check by the total absence of 
freedom of association. ~ 
·· Striking worktr killed in ~ Medan 
. . 
. . ~- . . _.. . . . 
A worker wllo w~ on strike and taking part in a 
J'rotestraijy died when he plunged int0 a river on ·12 
· ' March;· du!'fug · clciShes between -workers and the 
:~~ii~~=e~e~&~ri~~~~ d~:i:;~ 
o.~a& named as Rusli, 22 years old. · 
: ]he ·Solidarity Mtion Fo~m ' and Command Post 
... for the Restorijtfon ·'of Workers', Rights iri Medan has 
·. called on the National COlnm~oll for ·Human Rights 
to .investigate the circumstances of Rusli's death . . 
. The clashes ~tween workers and the local police 
.. broke out after thousands 'of'workel'S from a nuinber 
·. of factories in Medan . took strike ~ction to demand 
· payment of their . allowance for the· Ubaran Mmliin 
festival; they . were . 'pressing> too :for .. holiday . rights; 
better social facilities and for the bo~ to >pay them 
·.. +the; ntinimuin wage. fixed l>Y .the goverii1'tcnt. . · · · 
?! According . to . one :press: '. report; ~ WorkCJS >in . six· 
difference factories fu the city have been simultane-
ously involved in · strikes for · similar ·demandS. The 
regional Manpower <lffice: is .quoted ·~: saying that .... · 
some 30,000 workeJ'S have taken part in demonstra- · 
. tions. [Republika~ 9;3~ 1994] · - . ... . . 
.. ·.·· •.. It is not c~ar from the press repo~ exac:tly bow 
Ruslifell ipfo the rivet~ On<the same<occasiOnthc 
police rounded up ~me two · tho~ · people in an 
effort to stop worker$ . from takll.lg action. (Jakarta 
•. Post, ; 18.3~1994] ·. .·. > ' . .. : < · · ·. -. - .· .. · .. .: ; 
. Following the tragic :'. death Qf Mausinah laSt May, 
this . new tragedy will :be exiQnined v_ery closely' by 
· .. ~an .. rigilts actiVis~ SBSl .chair, . Pakpaban, has . 
· ·.··. tm.velled to Medan >to investigate the incident Some 
of the unfon's ,moSt active branches are ill Medan . . 
Comparative Wage Labour 
Expenditures, 1991 
(In US$ cent per hour) 
'. ·e:aUNTRy · wAGES~EXTRAS1TOTAI.J 
. . 
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Military intervention in labour disputes 
Alongside the issue of freedom of association, an end to the right of the security forces to intervene in 
labour disputes is at the heart of the struggle in Indonesia today to democratise the trade union 
movement and give workers the space to improve their living standards and working conditions. 
Ministerial Decision 342 of 1986 legitimised armed forces 
intervention 'to prevent damage to property'. It came into 
force when Admiral Sudomo, previously commander of the 
notorious army security command Kopkamtib, was Minister 
of Manpower. Repeal of this Decision was one of the key 
recommendations of the US Trade Representative Office as 
a condition for the prolongation of GSP trade privileges for 
Indonesia. 
It was not surprising therefore that just six weeks before 
the decision on whether to prolong GSP was due, Decision 
342 was revoked by a new ministerial decision, 15A of 
1994. Some saw this as a move in the right direction, others 
as nothing more than a ploy to mollify Washington. What 
most people had overlooked was that in 1990, after Kop-
kamtib was replaced by Bakorstanas with much the same 
powers as its predecessor, the new agency issued a Decree 
which provided for local security forces - the police and 
the army - to 'help resolve' strikes. Here then are two 
conflicting Decisions. With the Bakorstanas decree still in 
force, the ministerial decision has hardly any significance. 
As the Legal Aid Institute points out, 'PoliticaJly speaking, 
Bakorstanas is far more powerful than the Manpower 
Minister. Since law is based on politics, the more powerful 
political force will have the upper hand.' The Institute said 
that the question of military intervention would not be 
resolved until all the regulations allowing it to happen had 
been revoked. [LBH Press Statement, 19.I.1994] 
Jakarta's military commander, Major-General Hendropri-
yono was in no doubt on the matter. Should difficulties 
arise (in a dispute) and one of the sides needed the help of 
the armed forces, they would intervene, he said. It was just 
a matter of procedure. When things get tough, the police 
will be called in, and the police can always ask the army 
for help, he said. [Republika, 17.I.1994] 
The Manpower Ministry itself does not exclude the 
likelihood of the armed forces getting involved. As one of 
its most senior officials, Suwarto, Director-General for 
Labour Standards, put it: 'In a case that is a simply one of 
technicalities regarding the labour force, it will be left to us 
to handle it', but should things go beyond that, the armed 
forces will not be excluded. There is nothing in Ministerial 
Decision 15A to say that the armed forces are not allowed 
to intervene.' [Editor, 3.2.1994] Even the most hardened 
cynic could not have thought that one up! 
SBSI members in Lampung feel the pressure 
Recent events at a factory in Bandar Lampung, South 
Sumatra are a good example of what can happen when the 
workforce decides to join the SBSI. On 27 December last, 
a branch-level 'commisariat' of the SBSI was formed at CV 
Bumi Waras plant when 600 workers opted to join the 
SBSI. One of the first actions of the branch was to demand 
that the company pay the officially-set minimum wage of 
Rp 2,450 a day, instead of Rp 2,000. The company 
responded by saying that the eleven union officials would 
be transferred to another of the company's plants, 40 kms 
away. Before they had time to confer with their families, 
they were given the sack. When workers at the plant took 
action in solidarity and decided to demonstrate against the 
dimissals, taking their demands to the regional assembly, 
they found their way blocked by the police. The 'trouble-
makers' were summoned for interrogation for four days by 
the police and ordered to sign a statement which they were 
not allowed to read. Only later did they realise that they 
had committed themselves to leaving the SBSI. 
Workers who find themselves face to face with the 
security forces can be excused for fearing that they too 
could suffer the same fate as the hands of the armed forces 
as Marsinah. The journal which reported this dispute made 
a point of asking: 'Who can guarantee that another "Mars-
inah Case" will not befall them?' [Editor, 3.2.1994] l} 
continued from page 9 
of association and ending military intervention in labour 
disputes, to warrant such a generous response from the 
Clinton administration. Clearly, political considerations have 
outweighed considerations about the labour rights situation. 
President Clinton was delighted with President Suharto's 
decision to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
{APEC) summit last October in Seattle and will not want to 
upset the Indonesian ruler whose guest he will be when the 
next APEC summit takes place next October in Indonesia. * 
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How Reebok exploits its Indonesian workforce 
The following extract is from an interview of Pharis Harvey, Executive Director of the International 
Labour Rights Education and Research Fund in Washington, published in 'Multinational Monitor~ 
December 1993. Along with Asia Watch, the ILRERF submitted evidence to the US Trade Representa-
tive in 1992, arguing that GSP trade privileges should be withdrawn from Indonesia. 
MM: Could you describe briefly how shoe production 
works in Indonesia? 
Harvey: There are about 25,000 workers in the shoe 
industry m Indonesia. They work for about seven or eight 
large companies that are about half Korean owned and half 
Indonesian owned, and make their product on consignment. 
So the same companies may be producing for both Reebok 
and Nike. Adidas is there. They're all there. Converse is 
moving in. Converse has done a lot of procluction in the US 
but they're moving out now, to Indonesia or Australia. 
MM: What are the wages and working conditions? 
What is it like for people who might want to unionise? 
Harvey: Well, if they want to unionise, then the SPSI, the 
Indonesian govemment-controJJed union, comes in and sets 
up the union for them. Those who attempt genuine, free 
union organising get fued, hauled off to jail or 'disappear' 
and are occasionally killed. 
Wages in the shoe industry in Indonesia tend to hover 
between 2.,...3,000 rupiahs, about a dollar to a dollar fifty a 
day. There · was recently a stoppage at Reebok. 
MM: Last year Reebok adopted a code of conduct 
regarding the factories in Indonesia. Has the company 
done anything concrete about implementing it? 
Harvey: Well, I'm waiting. We did a lot of work with them 
on the code in August. And they made quite an extensive 
tour of all their plants to try to get an accurate picture, and 
Doug Kahn from their human rights foundation came back 
from his tour recognising that there were some problems in 
some of 'the factories. But he frankly said: 'I don't know 
how far We can go on this and how fast we can go On this. I 
MM: Couldn't Reebok simply say to its contractors: 
'Pay a .higher wage'? 
Harvey: They could do that. 
MM: If Reebok. doubled the wages of its workers in 
Indonesia, what effect would that have on its overall 
costs and profits? 
Harvey: Well, if Reebok doubled their wages, it could raise 
the cost of a shoe from $79 to $80 and nobody would ever 
notice it. There is now about $1 worth of labour that goes 
into a shoe. 
In 1991, Paul Fireman, the CEO [chief executive officer] 
of Reebok, was paid at least two times as much as the 
entire workforce of the Indonesian shoe industry. Reebok 
has 25,000 workers in Indonesia. If you allow $1.50 a day, 
for 300 days a year, you've got an annual wage of $500 a 
person. Add a few benefits and bring it up to $600 maybe. 
25,000 times $600 is $15 million, and that's the most 
generous counting. Fireman made $31,000,000 in 1991. 
MM: What do you think of companies like Reebok, 
which give human rights awards*), and make a major 
point of claiming that they're a company that stands for 
human rights? 
Harvey: I think it makes them vulnerable to some practices 
within their own industry. It puts a heavy burden on us and 
you to look at their records to see if they deserve the 
accolades they give themselves. iC 
*) Reebok gave one of its 1992 human rights awards to Fernando 
Araujo, and East Timorese student who is serving a nine-year 
sentence in Cipinang Prison. 
GSP: Washington postpones decision 
The US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, announced 
on 15 February that the decision on whether to keep or 
abolish GSP - Generalised System of Preferences -
privileges for Indonesia is to be postponed for six months, 
to August 1994. This means, he said; that the review of 
Indonesian labour rights policies has been 'suspended' 
though not 'terminated'. 
Under US law, GSP privileges which allow duty-free 
access to the US market for the products of manufacturing 
industries in developing countries cannot be granted to 
countries where labour rights are not upheld. 
Asia Watch, the New York-based human rights organisa-
tion which, along with the International Labour Rights 
Educatfon and Research Fund, petitioned the US govern-
ment to examine Indonesia's eligibility to enjoy trade 
privileges under GSP, described the decision as unsatisfac 
tory. 'On the one hand,' said Asia Watch executive director 
Sidney Jones, 'it says that Indonesia has not done enough to 
merit a termination of the review. That's an understatement 
especially given the arrest of labour activists (on the eve of 
the SBSI strike). On the other hand it lets Indonesia off the 
hook by saying that the review has been suspended (which) 
removes the pressure to carry the reforms any further.' 
Asia Watch also criticised the decision as being empty of 
any specifics. While saying the Trade Representative would 
assess continuing progress in six months, it does not say 
what Indonesia is expected to do. 'Unless those details are 
spelled out and made public, the six-month assessment is 
meaningless.' [Asia Watch Press Release, 16.2.1994) 
As the articles appearing elsewhere in this Bulletin show, 
no progress has been made on the crucial issues of freedom 
continued on page 8 
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Show trials turn into a farce 
The brutal murder last May of the woman trade union activist, Marsinah, led to nationwide and 
international condemnation. But far from solving the murder, the trials now under way in East Java 
have been shown to be part of an official cover-up, reinforcing the widely-held suspicion that army 
officers were responsible for her death. 
There is nothing new about trials in Indonesia serving a 
poJiticaJ purpose, nor indeed about unashamed collusion 
between the judiciary and army intelligence in mapping out 
a scenario and dictating the verdicts in advance. What 
makes the Marsinah murder trials so sensational is the sheer 
scale of the conspiracy and the way in which the carefully ..... 
laid plans have backfired. 
Eight men and a woman have been charged as accom-
pli~s in Marsinah's murder. They include the owner of the 
watch-making factory, PT Catur Putra Surya (PT CPS) 
where Marsinah worked, the factory manager, the personnel 
director, two factory-floor supervisors and several security 
guards. It was clearly the intention of the cover-up to make 
it appear as if the employers' motive in wanting to eliminate 
Marsinah was that after thirteen of her co-workers involved 
in the strike were dismissed, she allegedly threatened the 
company with exposure for producing forged watch brands. 
No evidence has been produced that she ever made such a 
threat. 
The murder of Marsinah led to a nationwide campaign of 
protest. The victim was proclaimed a martyr of the working 
people's struggle and she was posthumously awarded the 
1993 Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Prize on 10 Decem-
ber last. The case was highlighted by Indonesian NGOs at 
the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna in June. Later, 
a t~am sent by the Clinton Administration to review Jabour 
practices in preparation for a decision on whether to 
withdraw GSP trade privileges (see separate item) made 
inquiries about the tragedy. 
All this attention convinced the military authorities in East 
Java that they would have to come up with a plausible 
account of the murder, supported by convictions in court. 
The army knew very well that they had a case to answer. 
The military have been intervening in Jabour disputes for 
years. The Sidoarjo military command (kodim) was directly 
implicated in the crushing of the strike at PT CPS. On the 
day following the strike, thirteen workers accused of 
leading the strike were dismissed by the company on the 
orders of the military command. The dismissals took place 
at kodim headquarters where they were given their sever-
ance pay. One of Marsinah's last deeds before her tragic 
death was to protest to kodim about its treatment of her 
colleagues and to discuss with friends her proposal to Jay 
formal charges against the army command in a court of 
law. 
19-day abduction by the military 
For five months after Marsinah's badly mutilated body was 
found in a forest on 8 May, the police claimed that investi-
gations were under way but had nothing to show for it. 
Then on 1 October, nine people were abducted from their 
homes or from the factory and held incommunicado until 
19 October. Relatives were told nothing about their where 
. . 
. . 
.. .... · 
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Which scenario? 
)) 
Pikiran Rakyat 10 March 1994 
abouts and were only able to make contact after they were 
transferred to police custody. Later it transpired that they 
had been held by intel, the intelligence unit of the East Java 
Brawijaya Military Command in Waru. 
A scenario of the murder had been concocted by intel and 
each of the abductees was subjected to terrifying bouts of 
torture to force them to sign Interrogation Reports (BAP) 
incriminating themselves and the others as accomplices in 
Marsinah's murder. 
Within days of their transfer to police custody, the press 
was supplied with the army's version which was reproduced 
in detail in a number of newspapers and soon after, the 
trials began. Most of the accused were also named as 
prosecution witnesses in the other trials. However, the case 
began to unravel when some of the nine publicly retracted 
the confessions that had been forced froni them and 
complained bitterly of the torture to which they had been 
subjected. All have now retracted their written testimonies. 
Yet, in each of the trials, the judges have shown no 
sympathy for these victims of army intel brutality. Going 
against the norms of natural justice, the judges have insisted 
on using the signed testimonies despite pleas from Jawyers 
that testimony obtained under duress cannot be accepted as 
evidence in a court of law. 
Some of the witnesses who testified in the trial of person-
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nel manager, Mutiari, later retracted their written state-
ments. When her lawyers sought the court's permission to 
summon the witnesses again, the judges refused. The 
lawyers then staged a walk-out, insisting that it was 
intolerable for the trial record not to be rectified. 
'Republic of Fear' 
The role of army intel was most effectively exposed in a 
statement in court by defence lawyer, Trimoelya D Soerjadi, 
defending Judi Susanto, the factory proprietor who faces a 
charge of premeditated murder and a possible death 
sentence. His lawyer is chair of the East Java Bar Associ-
ation, IKADIN. 
In his demurrer entitled The Republic of Fear, Trimoelja 
challenged the basis of the charges against his client. He 
insisted that the alleged murder plot had been written by the 
security forces. 
'The intel are far too powerful. One reason is Qiat the 
Armed Forces are too dominant in this country. Military 
intelligence sh'ould direct its activities towards the outside 
world . but here in Indonesia they direct all their efforts 
towards domestic forces. This engenders an atmosphere of 
fear in the community. ' 
The fact that the arrest, detention and questioning of all 
those accused of complicity in Marsinah's murder had been 
handled by the East Java Military Command intel, showed 
just how immense was the role of the intel in all facets of 
life, said the lawyer. He told the court that he himself had 
been warned by local army officers that he was being 
watched by intel. 
'It was the overwhelming presence of fear, fear and yet 
more fear that caused my client and all the other accused 
to 'confess'. [Jawa Pos and Republika, 22.2.1994) 
The kinds of torture employed 
Each of the accused had gruesome accounts of the torture 
they suffered. Besides being beaten and kicked, their 
interrogators apply electricity to their genitals each time 
they gave an answer not in line with the army's scenario. 
One of the accused, factory manager Judi Astono, broke 
down in court as he tried to describe the indignities he 
suffered. 
'They forced me to lick the floor of my cell with my 
tongue. They urinated in the cell and forced me to lie down 
there. They beat me every time I gave them the wrong 
answer. They brought my wife and child to see what they 
were doing ... ' At this point, he was overcome by emotion. 
Asked about a meeting of factory staff when the murder 
of Marsinah was allegedly planned, Judi Astono said, There 
was never any such meeting. But the judge was unim-
pressed by this evidence, given under oath in court and 
shrugged off. the torture accounts. Wh_en he challenged · the 
accused to prove that he had been physically assaulted, Judi 
Astono pulled back his shirt to reveal a gash five .centi-
metres long at the top of his left arm. 
Missing witnesses 
The intel scenario alleged that the factory staff had plotted 
the murder on the orders of factory owner Yudi Susanto at 
a meeting which was held the day after the workers went 
on strike. Two members of staff then allegedly invited 
Marsinah to join them for a meal and drove her off by 
motor-bike. She was later bundled into a car and driven to 
Susanto's home where she was ferociously beaten and ' left 
without food. A hard object was thrust into her vagina to 
make it appear as if she had been raped. Bleeding profuse-
ly, she was left to die in the room of a maid-servant who, 
together with another servant, later allegedly washed away 
the blood and burnt the blood-stained clothes she was 
wearing. 
Between justice and the ha.mmer Kompas, 5 March 1994 
Although the courts have made use of the . testimony of 
the two maid..:.servants, the women have not appeared in 
person. According to media reports, they are 'dalam 
pingitan' or 'in purdah'. Lawyers have asked why the two 
women are not among the accused. Their alleged complicity 
as accessories to the crime, for having destroyed evidence 
would appear to be far more important than the personnel 
manager, Mutiari, whose only crime was allegedly to have 
known of the murder plot because she was present - though 
said nothing - at the meeting when the plot was allegedly 
hatched. 
Mutiari, the first of the nine defendants to go on trial, has 
been found guilty of being an accessory to the crime and 
sentenced to seven months. Her lawyer, Richard Wahyudi, 
said he would be appealing against the sentence. 'We would 
have lodged an appeal even if they had sentenced her to 
one day in jail,' he toJd The Jakarta Post [11.3.1994] 
She was distraught throughout the ordeal, lost weight and 
suffered an abortion brought on by the stress of her abduc-
tion and mat-treatment. 
Army captain 'helped along' by judge 
To satisfy public suspicions of army involvement in 
Marsinah's death, an army captain named Kusaeri who was 
commander of the local military command or koramil in 
Porong where the factory is located, has been suspended 
from duty and placed under military detention. By all 
accounts, he will be tried by a military court for failing to 
tell his superiors what he allegedly knew about the murder 
plot. He allegedly travelled in the vehicle in which Mar-
sinah was taken to Susanto's home and earlier knew of the 
meeting at which the murder was plotted. Or so be said in 
the Interrogation Report (BAP) which he signed. 
Yet when be appeared as a witness, his answers did not 
tally with his BAP. Cross-examining him, the prcsiding-
judge went to such lengths to get him to give the 'right' 
ans~ers that .the defence. lawyer asked the judge to stop 
leadmg the witness on or mterjecting answers whenever the 
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captain shrugged his shoulders and seemed unable to stick 
to his written testimony. Kusaeri's bumbling performance in 
court has been seen as one of the most glaring proofs of the 
baselessness of the official version. 
During a later appearance, as a witness in the trial of Judi 
Susanto, Kusaeri also retracted his BAP. 
LBH accuses the army of the murder 
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) launched 
its own inquiry into the murder case. Announcing the 
results, the head of the team, Teten Masduki, said all the 
evidence points to the military command (kodim) in 
Sidardjo as perpetrators of the crime because that was 
where Marsinah was last seen alive on 5 May, three days 
before her body was found. She went there to protest at the 
army's interference in the dispute and the sacking of 13 
workers. The LBH's findings indicate that Marsinah was so 
severely tortured at the kodim headquarters that she died in 
the hands of her torturers. 
Teten said that their findings bear out the protestations of 
all nine people on trial that they had nothing to do with 
Marsinah's murder. They are being used as scapegoats in an 
official cover-up, he said. [Jakarta Post, 8.3.1994] 
Many lawyers and human rights groups have called on the 
Supreme Court to halt the trials because they are frought 
with irregularities. But a member of the court, Justice Adi 
Andojo Soetjipto has claimed that criticism of the trials 
'could affect the impartiality of the judges'. (Jakarta Post, 
19.3.1994] This remark shows how far re~oved _the Court 
is from its statutory duty to protect the mtegnty of the 
judiciary. {t 
Campaign to gag academic on East Timor 
A leading Indonesian academic, Dr George Aditjondro, is 
facing a campaign of intimidation and villification follow-
ing the publication in the Australian press in March of 
some of his findings about the devastating consequences of 
Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor. His 
fmdings have convinced him that the people of East Timor 
are strongly opposed to integrasi. 
Aditjondro lectures on anthropology at the Satya Wacana 
Christian University in Salatiga, Central Java and is known 
for his research on environmental issues and also as a critic 
of developmental policy. He has written extensively on 
social developments in West Papua, having worked for 
years in Jayapura as director of the NGO, the YPMD. 
He bas written a number of papers recently about East 
Timor none of which he has been able to have published in 
Indonesia. Last July, he attended a seminar in Portugal 
about East Timor, during which he interviewed many East 
Timorese refugees. After returning home, he went to East 
Timot to carry out further anthropological research which 
he drew together in a paper entitled: From Memo to 
Tutuala {shortly to be published in Australia). Other recent 
papers are The Prospects of East Timor Development after 
Xanana's Capture and In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau. 
His extensive knowledge about and interest in East Timor 
date back to 1974 when, as a journalist working for the 
political weekly Tempo, he wrote a number of reports on 
the situation in the territory, before and after the invasion 
in December 1975. When the Indonesian Foreign Ministry 
alleged in a statemen~ seeking to discredit bis findings 
published in the Australian paper, The West Australian, that 
be bas never been recognised as an expert on East Timor, 
they were showing the depths of their ignorance about his 
academic and journalistic achievements. Siti Hardianti 
Rukmana, Suharto's eldest daughter, now a key figure in 
Indonesia's East Timor strategy, also questioned his integ-
rity in an attempt to gag him. 
Under threat 
When his findings were published in Australia, he was on 
a visit to Ethiopia. He returned home on 23 March to 
discover that some sections of the Indonesian press had 
been villifying him. Back in Salatiga, the rector of the 
university, Dr John Ihalauw, was under intense pressure 
from the Central Java military commander to sack him and 
evict him and his family from the campus. On the first 
night of his return, unidentified persons threw stones at his 
house just before 1 am, breaking several windows. 
Speaking out about East Timor is always a risky business 
for Indonesians and until now, no academics have dared do 
so. Professor Mubyarto of Gajah Mada University, Yogya-
karta, discovered how risky it was when he published the 
fmdings of a sociological study in East Timor in 1991, 
which recommended major changes in Indonesian policies 
because integrasi has been such a traumatic and alienating 
experience. 
The campaign to gag George Aditjondro is an attempt to 
silence critics of Indonesia's illegal occupation of East 
continu1d on pag1 2 
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The succession and the ABRI reshuffle 
"' Suh.a:to ~ statement that he would step down in 1998 has not created the stir one would expect. Many 
political analysts have reacted with great scepticism. After 26 years in power, it is difficult to accept 
the possibility that the aging dictator might actually resign. 
The longer Suharto has remained in power, the more he has 
got bogged down in a "Catch 22" situation. The business 
empires of his sons and daughters grow by the day, escalat-
ing the fear that any succession could jeopardise the family 
fortunes. Many political analysts are resigned to the idea 
that Suharto will follow in the footsteps of dictators like 
Generalissimo Franco to remain in power for life. Malting 
political forecasts is often akin to crystal-ball gazing. The 
signs are that Suharto has opted for another scenario. Three 
times already he has made public his intention to resign in 
1998. 
Javanese concept or power concept? 
People argue that according to Javanese tradition, the 
succession is never neatly planned. Palace intrigues, power 
struggles and coups pepper the history of Javanese king-
doms. Javanese dynasties were short-lived and successions 
were often bloody and tumultuous. For decades it seemed 
that Suharto would follow in the tradition of his Javanese 
predecessors. After reigning for almost 30 years it looks as 
if the cunning fox has decided to opt for a smoother way to 
handle the handover of the presidency. 
Weeks before Suharto's announcement, the Indonesian 
press were running major stories about the succession. Early 
this year, Amien Rais, a well-known Muslim leader 
launched the issue by stating that the time has come to 
replace the national leadership because Suharto is old. It 
would be unthinkable, a few months ago, that somebody 
would have dared to make a statement like this and get 
away with it. It had a snowball effect and soon newspapers 
and magazines were making the su~ion a hot issue. 
In Jakarta people insist that Suharto has chosen the more 
pragmatic power concept of su~ion. Hand-pick some-
body, preferably a whole junta, that can safeguard the 
Suharto family fortunes and at the same time guarantee a 
smooth handover. Behind the scenes be is intending to play 
the dalang (puppeteer) role: " ... even though I will be 014, I 
cannot abandon the struggle. I will always set the example 
from behind" (11ae Guardian, 14.3.1994]. It looks as though 
Suharto wants to follow the path of Ne Win and Deng 
Hsiao Ping, keeping control behind the scenes. 
The most likely scenario 
Any succession involves risks, not least because Suharto 
will be 78 in 1998. Disregarding factors like a slip in the 
bathroom or a coup, it is possible to concoct a scenario 
which is smooth and acceptable to Suharto. 
On 12 March, Suharto told the congress of the corporatist 
youth umbrella KNPI that he would not resign during his 
present five-year term which began in April 1993. But he 
also announced he would step down when he completes it. 
There are two plausible candidates for the presidency: the 
Vice-President, Ret'd General Try Sutrisno and Dr.BJ. 
Habibie, Suharto's closest political advisor. Both are suffi-
ciently loyal to Suharto; indeed they both got where they 
are today thanks to Suharto. 
At present Habibie is building bis own power base while 
General Try is taking a back seat. This fits in with Suharto's 
present power game of giving more leeway to civilians (i.e. 
the Habibie group) while pushing back the ambitious 
military. But Suharto cannot afford an open clash between 
Habibie and Sutrisno, which means a clash between 
technocrats/bureaucrats/technologists and the army. At a 
certain point Suharto will have to accommodate the mili-
tary, which may mean choosing Try Sutrisno as successor. 
General Try Sutrisno, now 58, fulfils the necessary 
criteria. He is acceptable to all wings of ABRI and being 
Javanese and Muslim strengthens his position enormously. 
He used to be Suharto's adjutant and his loyalty to Suharto 
is beyond doubt. He is not known to be very bright which 
gives Suharto a lot of leverage behind the scenes. Ideally 
Suharto would use both men, with Habibie as Vice-Presi-
dent. A neat scenario which could protect Suharto's empire. 
What about ABRI? 
This scenario is neat but sterile. It doesn't take the political 
ingredients into account. The role of ABRJ is still para-
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mount and the different political groupings might play a 
more important role in the coming years. While ARRI is 
ideologically still unified, different political wings are 
emerging. Some ARRI representatives, from both the retired 
and the active generations, have stated openly that the next 
generation should be ARRI, Muslim and Javanese. Suharto 
can easily accommodate thi~, but much more is at stake. 
Political and economic demands will also be part of the 
package. 
Suharto, the master puppeteer 
The main military doctrine dwifungsi, justifying the role 
of the military in society, will be upheld by the entire ARRI 
but differences will emerge in the modus of implementa-
tion. Suharto bas, through Commander-in-Chief General 
Faisal Tanjung, strongly promoted a 'back seat' position for 
the military. While the majority of officers, bred in the 
tradition of following orders, will accept this approach, 
some will not. Some high-placed military are getting 
increasingly frustrated with the back seat position or tut 
wuri handayani in ancient Javanese. The back seat position 
has harmed the army's position in society - fewer minister-
ial posts, ambassadorial posts and above all enjoying a 
smaller share of the national economic cake. 
Several ambitious officers argue: how can we take a back 
seat? ARRI account for only 0.25% of society. If we take 
a back seat, how can we fulfil our task of safe-guarding the 
nation? 
For decades the military have been accustomed to occup-
ying the front seat, or ing ngarso sung tulodo. It gave ARRI 
all the benefits imaginable. A change in the country's 
leadership will give ambitious officers the opportunity to try 
to occupy the vanguard position onte again. 
Big overhaul in ABRI 
Prior to Suharto's announcement about stepping down, a 
major overhaul took pl~ce in ARRI. Only now do people 
realise that this was a step for the Suharto group to curb 
military influence. Two major ARRI pillars underwent 
changes: military intelligence and its civic wing. 
As in many other authoritarian countries, day to day 
oppression is bandied by security and intelligence bodies. 
It often happens that those bodies become powerful and 
uncontrollable. This Frankenstein effect can be seen with 
BAIS (Badan lntelijen Strategis, the Military Strategic 
Intelligence Body). BAIS was the brainchild of General 
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Benny Murdani. In the ARRI reorganisation of 1983 he 
fused several intelligence bodies into one body: BAIS, 
directly under his control. The other body, BA.Kl(". was. kept 
alive under Suharto's supervision but became mcreasmgly 
toothless. BAJS was like a government within a govern~ent: 
it could take decisions to send crack troops to East TIIllo_r, 
Aceh or other places and could interfere elsewhere, m 
social-political and economic affairs. With the removal of 
Benny Murdani and his closest aides, Suharto felt the n~ed 
to get rid of the Benny structures so BAIS bas been dis-
solved and replaced by BIA (Badan lntelijens ABRI, the 
ABRI InteUigence Body) which will be under the ~ed 
Forces Chief of General Staff, longer under the C-m-C, 
making the body less prestigious. 
Another blow was struck at the position of the Chief of 
Staff of Social and Political Affairs, the officer responsible 
for applying the Dwifungsi doctrine. The previous . holder 
Lt.General Haryoto, appointed seven months ago, was 
ditched and replaced by a more senior officer Lt. -General 
Hartono. The reason is obvious: Haryoto was playing the 
front seat game while Hartono represents the back seat 
approach. Other front seaters like the notorious Major-
General Theo Syafei were also removed from office. Syafei, 
a typical field-soldier will run the Staff College, hardly a 
place where he can exert any political pressure. 
The last bastion to be reformed was the ABRI fraction in 
Parliament. Some of the most vocal officers like Major 
General . Sembiring and Major General Samsudin were 
replaced. 
Democracy and human rights 
In the present situation Suharto can rely on Joyal officers in 
the most strategic positions. Betting on the loyalty of most 
military, Suhrto could afford to make major changes 
without provoking a backlash. His brother-in-law General 
Wismoyo is expected to become the ABRI Commander-in-
Chief. It probably is all too neat. 
For those who struggle for democracy and a just society, 
a front or back seat for ARRI makes little difference. 
Suharto's flirtation with openness and democracy is part of 
his power game. In the end other factors will determine the 
fate of Suharto, his successor and ARRI. The booming 
economy is coming unstuck: demands for freedom of 
association by striking workers and more freedoms by 
student protests are growing and becoming routine. Workers 
and students have become more defiant and old intimidation 
tactics used by the security forces are backfiring. Th~ 
Suharto succession could have a bumpy ride after all. . ._ 
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cated by the Cornell Paper, that the G/30/S was an internal 
army conflict, and the Wertheim version of the 1965 events 
as a successful army coup, have lately gained grotind in 
Indonesia. [Tempo, 19.2.1994) 
In deciding to publish the White Book, the government 
appears to have concluded that the several official versions 
produced so far have not satisfactorily dealt with Cornell, 
Wertheim and other accounts published abroad. 
Wimanjaya's fate 
So, what wilJ happen to Wimanjaya? He has been interro-
gated by the Attorney..!.General's Office and the Jakarta 
Military Command had a long session with him. One would 
expect him to face charges of insulting the president but 
those in positions of authority may fear that putting him on 
trial would give him an excellent platform to accuse 
Suharto of his ten cardinal sins. * 
A banned book and the White Book 
A sure way to create public demand for a book is to ban it. When Prima Dos a was banned in January, 
the price quadrupled. After President Suharto publicly commented on the book, it was on the way to 
becoming a collector~ item. 
The author, Wimanjaya K. Liotohe, a self-styled Pente-
costal preacher, says Prima Dosa (Cardinal Sin) is a law 
suit against the Indonesian government or more specifically 
against the Suharto empire. The title hints at a variety of 
targets: Indonesia's Primadonna is Suharto and its contents 
deal with the ten cardinal sins he has committed against 
society. The three volumes of the book include a number of 
documents. So far it has only appeared in manuscript, 
laser-printed or repeatedly photocopied. While he was in 
Europe last summer, Prima Dosa circulated widely among 
Indonesians abroad. Wimaµjaya officially lodged his 
complaint with the Jakarta District Court on 29 December 
1993. A month later, on 25 January, the Attorney General 
Singgih slapped an official ban on the book. 
The spectre of 1965 
Two days earlier, Suharto speaking to naval officers, 
commented: 'I have received a book called Prima Dosa. It 
assails the present government and accuses me of being the 
mastermind of G/30/S PK/, because it says that Lt.Colonel 
Untung used to be under my command. They are distorting 
the facts. ' Although Prima Dosa adds nothing new to the 
still incomplete puzzle about the coup events of October 
1965, it clearly annoyed Suharto. Charges about Suharto's 
role in 1965 and his close connections with G/30/S leaders 
like Lt.Colonel Untung and Colonel Latief keep springing 
up, and from unexpected quarters. 
In the presence of naval officers, Suharto kept control of 
his feelings but in the next few days, he launched his 
damage-control operation. Two close confidants and former 
assistants, ret'd . Generals Alamsyah and Cokropranolo 
assured the press that Suharto was not involved in the 1965 
events. The banning· of Prima Dosa came next, followed by 
a government announcement that it would publish a White 
Book on the 1965 events in May 1994. 
The White Book 
For years, publication of the White Book has been promised 
but it now seems that the government means business. 
Defence Minister ret'd General Edi Sudradjat said the draft 
has been ready for some time but had been delay because 
various people still had to check the contents. Suharto's 
Chief of Staff Lt.General Murdiono who heads the team 
that wrote the White Book said it would include the names 
of aU the persons involved in the events. It will consist of 
facts, mostly taken from the trial records of PK.I members 
allegedly involved in the coup attempt. More than a dozen 
people contributed to writing the book, said Murdiono 
without mentioning names. 
The White Book will, according to Murdiono, describe the 
revolt instigated by the Communist Party. 'We will prove 
from history that the PK! was part of an international 
communist movement that always infiltrates their people 
everywhere'. (Forum Keadilan,No. 23, 3.3.1994). 
Major-General Suharto in 1965 
Head of the Armed Forces History Department, Brig. 
General Slamet Soegiardjo admitted that one of the objec-
tives of the White Book was to clarify different interpre-
tations of the G/30/S, inside and outside the country. 'In 
essence, the government wants to end the polemic about 
G/30/S-PKI', said the general (Tempo, 19.2.1994). 
Previous government versions 
There have been several attempts to give the official 
version of the 1965 events. In 1968 an account was written 
by ret'd Lt.General Ismael Saleh (army historian and former 
Justice Minister) and the late army historian Brig. General 
Nugroho Notosutanto. The Coup Attempt of the September 
30 Movement in Indonesia appeared in English (the 
Indonesian version appeared in 1989) and was intended to 
counter foreign publications in particular the Cornell Paper 
by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey. The Saleh/Nugroho 
book, for all its obvious flaws, is still regarded as the 
official version and used in schools. 
A second version written at the same time by another 
military team, headed by inteJligence officer, Lt. General 
Sutopo Yuwono, was completed but never published. In 
1978 another military team under the auspices of Kopkam-
tib, the notorious security agency, published their version, 
which talks about the involvement of President Sukarno in 
the events. Yet another version, produced by the Army 
History Department, came out some time later. Both 
versions reached a very limited public. 
Wimanjaya raises the crucial question of the relations 
between Suharto and Lt.Colonel Untung and Colonel Latief. 
The political weekly Tempo reported that the view advo-
continued on page 14 
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Death squads on the rampage again 
'Petrus' practices are again being widely reported in the Indonesian press. Petrus is a familiar 
acronym, dating back to the mid-eighties. It seems that 'petrus' of the nineties is unlike the eighties. 
It is no longer a clandestine operation. Security officers in regular uniform are carrying out 
extrajudicial executions on the streets of Jakarta. 
Petrus is the acronym of penembak misterius (mysterious 
kiIJer) used for the death-squads of the mid-1980s that 
conducted an anti-crime wave. President Suharto frankly 
admitted in his autobiography that he gave orders "to shoot 
to kill" as a shock therapy against criminals. The executions 
often took place in crowded urban areas; the corpses were 
left on the streets to scare the public. Often, alJeged crimi-
nals were taken from jails and executed in a market place, 
the most blatant form of extrajudicial killing. Although it 
was a public secret that the police and army were the 
killers, they were not in uniform with insignia so could not 
be identified. Until Suharto accepted responsibility, the 
official version was that the government was not to blame. 
The present wave of anti-crime operations is different 
Operasi Kilat Jaya (Operation Mighty-strike) launched by 
Polda Metro Jaya, the Jakarta Metropolitan Police, does not 
beat about the bush. The executions are carried out in 
public by police officers in uniform. 
In self-defence? 
In charge of the operation is Police Major-General M. 
Hindarto who admits that his men have shot alleged 
criminals. He says: "We want society to be peaceful and 
calm". Hindarto denies that he has issued shoot-to-kill 
orders and claims that his men act in self-defence. 
'I'm not reviving petrus but I don't want my men to die for 
nothing (orig: mati konyol). There is nothing mysterious 
about it. Everything is clear. The police officer in charge 
takes responsibility. There is no petrus.' [Forum Keadilan 
no. 24, 17.3.1994). 
According to police statistics for the first two months of 
1994, 24 people were shot, of whom 14 were killed on the 
spot and the rest were treated in hospital. On the night of 
22 February alone, six alleged criminals were shot dead and 
in the first week of March another ten fataIJy wounded. 
There is a consistent thread in the police reports; the 
majority of victims are said to be people with a criminal 
record and were probably under arrest. The shooting occurs 
at night-time. The reason: the victim tried to flee or was 
resisting arrest. 
A Legal Aid Institute (LBH) lawyer from Jakarta said: 
Two days ago, the parents of a victim lodged a complaint 
with the LBH because their son had been seized by police 
officers. According to the police the suspect was to be 
questioned on charges of drugs dealing. A few days later 
the parents read in the press that their son had been found 
shot dead. What makes us even more suspicious is that the 
parents were not allowed to see their son's body at the 
mortuary. Besides this we note that special armed police 
units use motor-bikes. We suspect that these units are 
ready for operations like this.' [BBC-Indonesia, 1.3.1994). 
The US State Department country Report on lndones1a 
wrote, concerning the latter part of 1993: 
' .... Human rights monitors estimated between 60 and 70 
people had been shot by police in the capital by the end of 
the year, although exact statistics were not available. In the 
province of North Sumatra, a policy of shooting criminal 
subjects in the legs, sometimes repeatedly, continued. Press 
accounts indicate that through early December police in 
North Sumatra had shot 74 ·suspects, 8 fatally, who were 
allegedly resisting arrest. Human rights groups protested 
that the methods used are unjustifiably harsh and violate 
due process. ' [US State Department Human Rights Country 
Reports 1993, pubJished March 1994). 
Presumption of innocence 
The excessive use of force by the police has the backing of 
Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Feisal 
Tanjung who said: 'Bandits have to be exterminated. No 
way we will foster them .... After giving a warning shot, they 
don't stop. There is nothing left but to exterminate them. ' 
[Kompas, 3.3.1994). This kind of talk is welcomed by some 
sections of society who fee] threatened by the growing 
crime rate. No correlation is made between the rise in urban 
poverty and the rise in crime. 
Human rights campaigners like Abdul Hakim, Frans 
Hendra Winarta and Djohan Djauhari argue that the 
government should examine the roots of the high crime 
rate, poverty. At the same time the presumption of inno-
cence should be upheld. Somebody can be called a criminal 
only if proven guilty and convicted by a court. 
Suharto's shock therapy a decade ago did not eradicate 
crime. It is not likely that this second wave of Petrus wilJ 
do any better. Eradicating poverty is the only way forward. 
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Solution near for Acehnese refugees 
According to reliable sources, a solution is near for the Acehnese refugees that have been camping at 
the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur since 22 June 1992. The stumbling block was the refusal of the 
Malaysian government to recognise the forty-four as asylum seekers. 
It seems the Malaysians have now dropped their opposition 
and are prepared to issue Malaysian documents to the 
refugees. The solution offered by the Malaysians is a 
compromise because the status of asylum seekers is still 
being denied. After camping for almost two years on 
UNHCR grounds it is likely they will accept the offer. 
Hopefully, procedures will start soon. The good intentions 
of the Malaysian government still have to be proved. There 
is enormous pressure from Jakarta on the Malaysian 
government. The bulk of Acehnese refugees are being held 
as detainees in the Malaysian prisons of Perak and Penang. 
Jakarta luring refugees 
The Indonesian government intends to send "a persuasive 
team" to Malaysia to convince the hundreds of Acehnese 
refugees to return home, said Indonesian ambassador to 
Malaysia Sudarmadi. He told a parliamentary hearing in 
Jakarta on 15 February, that the team would consist of up 
to ten religious leaders and several refugees who decided to 
return to Aceh. He said the two governments have agreed 
that the issue is a bilateral matter (sic) and would be 
handled without UN interference. 
Life sentence demanded 
Prosecutors at the Pidie District Court demanded life 
sentences for five alleged members of GAM (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement). The defendants were put 
on trial separately in early March. MH bin M was arrested 
in May 1993 after being shot by Indonesian security forces. 
According to the prosecution, MH bin M got nine months 
training in Libya and was under the instructions of Daud 
Paneuk, a leader of GAM. In another court, I bin Ab (27 
years) and Zul bin MD (33) were charged with involvement 
in acts aimed at spreading disunity and undermining state 
authority. In yet another courtroom, defendants J bin Y (24) 
and BI bin Ab (28) faced the same anti-subversion charges 
with a possible death penalty. [Kompas, 4.3.1994 and 
Indonesian Observer, 5.3.1994) 
Pidie, a poverty-stricken area 
Although it is the main rice-producing area of Aceh, the 
economy of Pidie district seems to be in dire straits. District 
Chief Diab Ibrahim revealed that 608 out of 948 villages 
are below the poverty line, a quite alarming figure. This 
was revealed during a working visit of 60 middle-ranking 
army officers to the area on 16 February. The reason for the 
visit was obvious: Pidie is one of the most difficult regions 
for Indonesian security forces. Rural Pidie has been the 
scene of the fiercest battles between Indonesian crack 
troops and GAM (Free Aceh Movement) units. In retaliation 
for many casualties, Indonesian troops have wrought havoc 
in the villages. It is likely that frequent military operations 
have created serious disturbances for food production. 
Diab Ibrahim admitted that some years ago the situation 
was grim. He gave the example of civil servants being too 
scared to use vehicles with red license plates, identifiable as 
government property. Privately owned cars use black 
license plates. He claimed that now the security situation is 
under control. [Waspada, 18.2.1994) 
This is not easy to believe because reports consistently 
mention serious human rights violations in the Pidie district. 
In September and October last year GAM units inflicted 
serious casualties on the Indonesian troops. In retaliation 
several villagers were killed while more than 20 people 
were taken to the prisons of Rancong and Lam Meulo. The 
names of the victims and detainees are given in the report. 
[Internal report from the Acheh-Sumatra National Liber-
ation Front, 1.11.1993) 
Guidance camp 
The officers also visited the lokasi pembinaan GPK (GPK 
guidance site) in Lhok Panah, subdistrict of Sakti. In this 
prison rehabilitation camp, people (alleged GAM members 
or sympathisers) receive guidance and training in agricul-
tural techniques. At present 56 people are held there. 
Colonel Fachrurrazi, one of the visiting officers, used the 
opportunity to give the 56 detainees a rousing pep-talk. 
Imprisoned without charge 
Two members of the newly installed Komnas HAM (Natio-
nal Human Rights Commission) made a quick visit to Aceh. 
The Komnas HAM was installed by presidential decree and 
still has to prove its credibility. The two, Asmara Nababan 
and Clementino dos Reis Amaral, found 11 people detained 
in the Lhok Seumawe prison without proper procedures. 
According to the criminal procedural code the pre-trial 
arrest period is 20 days with a maximum extension of 20 
days. One of the 11 detainees identified by the initials Yun 
bin Sah has been in prison since September 1989. Others 
have been there since 1990, 1991 or 1992. According to 
Nababan, seven of the eleven were interrogated by the 
attorney's office which concluded that there was no case 
against them. They were taken to the Lhok Seumawe prison 
by the local military command, the notorious Korem 
011/Lilawangsa. Nababan said that the eleven should be 
released immediately, rehabilitated and given compensation. 
Aceh briefing at the UN in Geneva 
During the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, 
human rights violations in Aceh were raised by many 
NGOs. For the first time a hearing on Aceh was organised 
by UNPO (Unrepresented Peoples and Nations 
Organisation) and endorsed by Pax Christi International and 
the International Federation for the Protection of the Rights 
of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Minorities. The 
briefing took place at the Palais des Nations. A documen-
tary on Aceh was shown and Tengku Hasan di Tiro spoke. 
* 
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A wretched homecoming 
An East Timorese studying in Salatiga, Central Java who returned to East Timor for a short visit last 
August has written a graphic account of his experiences at the hands of the forces of occupation. The 
following is a summary of his ten-page report. All the names have been removed to protect the 
identities of the raconteur, his f amity and friends. 
Troops waiting at the quayside 
Together with my friend, I arrived by sea at Dili harbour on 
15 August 1993 and saw troops lined up, standing guard on 
the quayside, blockading the exit. They were on the 
lookout, checking each arrival, especially foreign tourists or 
East Timorese, and checking all East Timorese students 
travelling from Java to East Timor. We were both under 
intense psychological pressure because we had been 
involved in the protests against the November 1991 mass-
acre. Those of us who have spent time in detention in 
Jakarta or in East Timor are always the focus of attention 
of the security forces who monitor our every move when 
we are in East Timor. 
When I was arrested in East Timor, Kopassus (crack-
troop) officers showed me lists of students who have been 
black-listed by the two intelligence agencies, BAIS and 
BAKIN in Jakarta and sent to East Timor. These lists are 
compiled by spies from several ABRl units and sent lo East 
Timor. The Maubere people are completely caged in by the 
Indonesian army's strategy. 
My friend and I didn't dare disembark because of the 
presence of combat troops and anti-riot squads dressed in 
camouflage who watched each passenger as they came 
down. We waited till the troops had left the quayside and 
then disembarked with the ship's crew. 
Shaking off the spies 
[ did not go straight home to my family for fear of being 
followed. Moreover, my older sister's home is in the 
vicinity of Kopassus HQ. I did not dare go and see my 
family for a week. They were afraid of me coming home, 
knowing that if I was arrested, they would also be targeted 
by security. Although it was very risky, I did what I 
planned to do which was, to take photos and make contact 
with the clandestine movement. · 
At home my parents would not allow me to leave the 
house after 6 pm; it is impossible for former political 
prisoners to move around East Timor unmolested. The intel 
use neighbours to spy for them. My brothers and sisters are 
often warned by the security not to go out in the evening. 
We live in constant fear of communicating with relatives in 
the evening. There are territorial (opster) troops on the 
prowl in every residential neighbourhood (desa) in Dili, on 
the lookout for any newcomer. All new arrivals must report 
to opster, to the local army command and to the village 
chief and explain who they are, where they are from, why 
they are there and what they intend to do. 
In particular East Timorese who are studying in Java, Bali 
or elsewhere in Indonesia are watched at all times; even 
when we stand waiting for a bus, there are spies hanging 
around, standing by our side, waiting for something to 
happen. What I can say about Dili is that there are more 
members of the armed forces there than ordinary people, 
many of them not in uniform. This often results in people 
disappearing to the remote comers, without the knowledge 
of their parents. There are ten to fifteen troops stationed in 
every single desa in Dili, including opster and combat 
troops. 
My trip to Ainaro and Zumalai 
I left for Ainaro on 29 August to go and see my family. 
This is the region where Falintil leader, Mau Hunu was 
arrested. For a trip like this, you need an identity card or a 
temporary identity card. I decided not to show anyone my 
student card. Without an identity card, you can be arrested 
and accused of being in the resistance. On arrival at my 
destination, I had to report to the local army and police 
posts, the district and sub-district army HQ and the local 
village head. On the way, I was able to observe quite a lot 
about the army's activities: 
* there are opster encampments every 15 kms, with 
heavily-armed combat troops; 
* these encampments are kept in readiness for operations, 
keeping an eye on the Maubere people; 
* whenever foreign visitors come to East Timor, they 
round up young people who are ready to go to Dili from all 
parts of the country and demonstrate; 
* the military arm some Maubere people for operations 
against their own people 
When I arrived in Ainaro I did not report to the security 
authorities. Things were tense because there were plans to 
demonstrate for a visit to Dili by a US congressional group. 
On the way to Ainaro, the bus was stopped at every place, 
Balibar, Remesiu, Aileu Kota, Daisoli, Maubisi, Dare and 
Ainaro. On the way to Zuma1ai. we had to stop at Boiliko, 
Casa, Oebaba and Zumalai. 
I arrived safely in Ainaro but I was arrested on 31 August 
while waiting for a bus to take me to ZumaJai. I was taken 
to Kodim for interrogation. They stripped me naked and 
found my student card which scared me. I was interrogated 
for five hours, terrorised and threatened, and asked ques-
tions about all kinds of things I didn't know anything about. 
Because I refused to say anything, they were about to take 
me to their HQ eight kms away but this did not happen 
because my uncle, a member of the Kopassus interrogation 
team, intervened. The next day, 1 September, I was 
released. 
I left for Zumalai on 12 8eptember. The journey to 
Zumalai was much worse because many of the troops on 
guard were former Timorese militia who have been indoc-
trinated to confront their own compatriots. 
My second arrest in Maliana 
I left for Maliana equipped with a camera. My plan was to 
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take photos of destroyed people's homes, of children made 
homeless because of the political situation or army pressure, 
bad social conditions, army camps, army activities and 
army stores. I wanted to take photos in a number of places 
in the central and western sector. 
The day after we began doing this, on 13 September, my 
friend and I were arrested as we were slipping across a 
field. Two soldiers caught us taking photos. They ordered 
us to lie down, tied our hands up and threatened to execute 
us there and then. One of them tortured us while the other 
asked questions. After about half an hour, a platoon of ten 
soldiers arrived. They frog-marched us to a small hut at the 
side of the road, stripped us naked and started beating us, 
hitting at our heads, chests, genitals, kidneys, thighs and 
knees. Soon our noses, mouths, ears were bleeding. 
Although we were both very weak, they forced us to stand 
up. We were pushed into a vehicle and driven to kodim in 
Maliana. For the first three days that we were held in 
Maliana, from 13 - 16 September, we were not given any 
food or drink. We were continually interrogated and asked 
why we were taking photos. I said this was for study 
purposes but they accused us of wanting to expose Indo-
nesia to the international community. Our hands were tied 
up, we were forced to stand facing the wall and they beat 
us, kicked us with their jackboots and banged our heads 
against the wall. The handcuffs cut into the flesh on our 
wrists. 
Three teams were involved in the interrogation, an 
execution team, an interrogation team and a torture team. 
Things got so nasty that we cried and screamed but they 
took no notice. After five hours, my friend was put into a 
cell and I was driven by an execution team to a place of 
execution. When we arrived, I was pushed out of the car 
still handcuffed, ordered to kneel down and start praying. 
This happened three times, after which they pushed me 
back into the car and took me back to kodim. We were held 
there for three days without food or water and not even 
allowed to urinate. 
Then on 17 September, my father turned up with clean 
clothes as the clothes I was wearing were covered in blood 
but he wasn't allowed in. The same thing happened when 
my sisters and their husbands came. They were warned not 
to tell the clergy what had happened to me. 
While we were being held at kodim in Maliana, a young 
boy from Atabae was brought in. He was accused of 
supplying food and medicine to the resistance. They 
suspected him because he sometimes came home from the 
fields late in the evening. After a few days, they could find 
no proof so they released him. 
We were transferred to Dili on 26 September but my 
family was not told of the move. The soldiers who escorted 
me to Dili did not wear uniform so people would not know 
who they were. In Dili we were taken to SGI (Special 
Intelligence Taskforce) at kopassus HQ. There I was 
subjected to continual interrogation for five hours by all the 
SGI officers, one after the other, using various forms of 
terror in their attempts to get informafion out of me. 
When my father found out that I had been moved - this 
was only after he brought food for me and was told that I 
was no longer there - he came to Dili but couldn't find out 
where I was. Eventually my older sister got a note from the 
local assembly asking kopassus to allow them to visit me. 
They came on 1 October and were told that I was about to 
be freed on certain conditions. Our families would have to 
accept responsibility if we engaged in political activities. 
We were taken to the governor and military commander 
and given guidance, then we were taken to SGI to sign a 
statement promising not to repeat our activities. We were 
required to reported daily to the SGI. We were under the 
surveillance of the SGI and officers came to my home 
every day to check up on me and my family. We were 
warned not to pass on information to any international 
organisation about the way we had been tortured. 
Possessions confiscated 






A camera and two rolls of film 
A wallet 
Two crucifixes and personal documents . 
While at SGI, I wrote to the kodim in Maliana where my 
things were being held but they only ever returned my 
student card. They even threatened me with trouble if I 
went on asking to have them back. 
I was required to report indefinitely so I decided to leave 
for Java, without informing the SGI. 
Here are the names of the three soldiers who tortured me 
at Kodim Maliana: 
1st sergeant Fritz Modeon from Sulawesi 
Private Sutrisno from West Java 
1st corporal Maumorin from East Timor. 
Plea to the world 
I hope that this chronological report of my arrest and 
torture will be a useful document and will have serious 
consequences for all international organisations concerned 
with human rights, so that it can help to stamp out all forms 
of violence and oppression practised by one nation against 
another, which are in gross violation of basic principles 
and international Jaw, and in particular that it will put an 
end to the 18-year-long sufferings of the Maubere people 
under a new form of colonialism which is being practised 
by Indonesia in East Timor. 
Signed 
Late 1993 
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IEAST TIMOR 
UN Human Rights Commission opts for consensus 
The UN Human Rights Commission decided this year to adopt a consensus statemen_t on East Ti~or 
rather than push for a resolution. East Timor was a focus of attention throughout the six-week sessi~n. 
However, some European missions were reluctant to support any move that would censure Indonesia. 
Objectively speaking, conditions were favourable for East 
Tim or as the meeting got under way. 
* John Pilger, one of the world's foremost TV documentary 
film-makers, had just completed a major film on East 
Timor which includes new information about Indonesian 
atrocities, (See separate item.] The film was given a special 
showing during the Commission meeting. 
* Information became available about a second massacre 
on the day of the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 
1991. Details of this atrocity were presented by eye-
witnesses to the Commission. (See separate item.] 
* Wide-ranging articles about conditions in East Timor 
were published in the Australian and the British press 
during the first weeks of the session. 
* Amnesty International presented a well-documented 
report to the Commission. Entitled: 'Indonesia and East 
Timor: Fact and Fiction', it made a careful examination of 
Indonesia's non-compliance with last year's resolution. 
As in previous years, many NGOs devoted considerable 
space in their submissions to the question of East Timor. 
The starting point for discussion was the Commission's 
strongly-worded resolution adopted in the 1993 session. 
The critical point in that resolution, which was ·adopted by 
23 votes to 12, with 15 abstentions, was Point 9, which 
urged Indonesia 'to invite the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary 
and Arbitrary Executions, the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention and the Worldng Group on Enforced or Involun-
tary Disappearances to visit East Timor to facilitate the 
discharge of their mandates'. 
Since then, none of these investigations had taken place. 
A call for Indonesia to 'further expand' access to East Timor 
had been largely ignored. A visit to East Timor last Sep-
tember by Swedish MPs resulted in a blistering attack by 
the MPs on the occupation authorities. In February 1994, 
the first visit by foreign journalists in nine months was 
highly unsatisfactory, as the journalists report. (See page 
22] Nothing in last year's resolution or in the consensus 
statement a year earlier, had been implemented. 
European Union's position crucial 
Negotiations for an initiative by this year's Commission 
took place between the European Union and Indonesia. 
Before the session the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Denmark, signalled that they would not go along with any 
criticism of Indonesia. Germany and the UK are too keen 
on promoting economic ties and arms exports to bother 
much about Indonesia's non-compliance with UN resol-
utions on East Timor. Some EU countries even accept 
Indonesia's intolerable refusal to implement any resolution 
that it has voted down. Such blackmail should not be 
allowed in the counsels of the UN. 
The negotiations therefore concentrated on reaching a 
consensus which is a minimalist approach. With diplomatic 
positions seemingly set and countries like the UK unwilJing 
even to consider pushing for a resolution should talks to 
reach consensus break down, it was obvious that little 
would be achieved. The Portuguese delegation could have 
played a more positive role in persuading its EU partners to 
press for more meaningful undertakings from Jakarta. For 
the first time in years, Portugal was not a member of the 
Commission but this need not have weakened its role in the 
lobbying process. 
UN investigations crucial 
The consensus statement which was adopted on 9 March 
has one advantage over previous Commission decisions. 
The sixth paragraph 'welcomes the undertaking by the 
Government of Indonesia to invite the Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions to visit 
East Timor and to submit his report to its 51st session. In 
the same spirit, the Commission takes note of the intention 
of the Government of Indonesia to continue to cooperate 
with other relevant special rapporteurs and/or working 
groups and to invite them to visit East Timor when necess-
ary for the fulfilment of their duties'. This means that UN 
investigations will not be limited to the four thematic 
mechanisms mentioned in the 1993 resolution but will 
include alJ the UN mechanisms. The additional ones, all 
important for East Timor, are concerned with violence 
against women, religious discrimination and the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. However, the last sentence is worded 
loosely enough to be pulJed in several directions. 
Nevertheless, it was this paragraph which led the National 
Council for Maubere Resistance (CNRM) to welcome the 
statement as 'a major victory for East Tim or'. The visit to 
East Timor of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions which is scheduled for June this year will be the 
first ever investigation of the 1991 massacre and reports of 
the second massacre at the military hospital. 
The CNRM stressed that it was now 'the responsibility of 
the UN Secretary-General to see to it that the government 
of Indonesia will fully comply with the provisions of the 
CHR consensus decision on East Timor.' On past record, 
Jakarta can be expected to try to wriggle out of its obliga-
tions. The UN secretary-general does indeed have a special 
role as convenor of the talks about East Timor under his 
auspices. The next round, to take place in Geneva in May 
this year, will have to concentrate on 'confidence-building 
measures' which should mean Indonesia implementing this 
year's Commission consensus. 
But there is another mechanism for pressuring Indonesia. 
The Commission has now appointed Jose Ayala Lasso, a 
diplomat from Ecuador, as the fust High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. He says of his new post: 'If the Human 
Rights Commission passes a resolution, sending monitors to 
certain countries, I will try to persuade governments of their 
duty to cooperate. In that sense, I am the new executive of 
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the Commission.' [International Herald Tribune, 14.3.1994] 
Impunity issue raised 
A major concern underpinning the Commission's work is 
impunity, when perpetrators of abuse, including unlawful 
killings, go unpunished; exacerbating the spiral of violence. 
The issue was raised by Liberation. Liem Soei Liong of 
TAPOL argued that the Indonesian military's security 
approach was closely intertwined with impunity. He listed 
numerous incidents - the petrus killings, the killings in 
West Java and Madura in 1993, and the Dili massacre in 
1991, as instances of perpetrators going unpunished. In the 
Tanjung Priok massacre of September 1984, 'not only did 
the perpetrators go unpunished, the authorities never even 
conducted an inquiry'. Military agencies like Bakorstanas 
and the new intelligence unit BIA, enjoy unlimited powers 
and are mainly responsible for such atrocities. 
He called on the Commission to consider appointing a 
Special Rapporteur on Indonesia. * 
UN Commission told about second massacre 
Three East Timorese who have recently left East Timor appeared as witnesses in Geneva to tell the UN 
Human Rights Commission about the second massacre in Dili on ·12 November 1991. The following 
is the text of their joint statement. They addressed the Commission under Item 12 of the agenda. 
The three of us present here are East Timorese living 
witnesses to the eighteen years occupation of our country, 
East Timor. 
Jose Simoes 
I am Jose Simoes, now 53 years old. I was first arrested by 
Indonesian security forces in 1978 but released some 
months later. I was frequently interrogated after my release. 
On 7 June 1980, I was arrested and released; on 26 July, 
1980 I was again arrested. Between 1980 and 1983, I was 
arrested three times for short-term detention. In 1985, I was 
transferred to a prison in Java. I spent a total of eight years 
in Indonesian jails, never once tried under due process of 
law, many times subjected to torture. 
Joao Antonio Dias 
I am Joao Antonio Dias, now 26 years old, a survivor of 
the worst nightmare of my life. I worked as a paramedic in 
the military hospital in Dili and was witness to the killing 
of wounded young East Timorese who survived the first 
massacre on 12 November 1991, at the Santa Cruz cem-
etery in Dili. 
The hospital was surrounded by large numbers of 
elements of the 744 Battalion, 433 Kostrad, the Mobile 
Brigade, Military Police and intelligence, preventing anyone 
from leaving the hospital ground. Between 50 and 200 
wounded people were taken there. 
I saw with my own eyes how Indonesian security forces 
used rocks to crush the skulls of wounded people. I saw 
army trucks crushing to death many wounded students lying 
on the ground outside the hospital. I saw with my own eyes 
how Indonesian security forces used lethal pills to poison 
the wounded. The Indonesians first wanted to inject the 
wounded with sulphuric acid. But I heard them argue with 
each other that this would cause a lot of pain and the 
victims would scream too mnch. They then asked the 
doctors for some pills. The doctors brought a jar of piJJs 
which were then given to some of the wounded, The 
victims started to lose strength, breathing became weaker 
and (they) died quickly. 
Indonesian doctors cooperated in the killing and I name 
Dr Nyoman Winyata, the director of the hospital, Dr 
Banban, and several other Indonesian doctors who spent 
six-month duty in East Timor. Nurses Joao Kota and 
Y ohanes also took part in the killing. 
Aviano Antonio Faria 
I am Aviano Antonio Faria, 23 years old, a survivor of the 
Santa Cruz massacre and of the second massacre the same 
day in the military hospital. I was taken to the hospital from 
the Santa Cruz cemetery. I was among the wounded people 
taken to the hospital. We were piled up in trucks, dead and 
wounded. We were then loaded like mere cargo, thrown on 
the dirt ground and then taken into the mortuary. I was 
there, next to the bodies piled up on each other. I pretended 
to be dead, but when the soldiers Jocked the room and left, 
I stood up to identify some friends. Many were alive. 
I saw so many young girls and boys severely wounded, 
but many alive. Some 15 to 20 minutes later, two soldiers 
came carrying a rock which one of them used to ..i;ruSh the 
skulls of those who were alive. The other used his gun to 
hit our heads. I pretended I was dead. Then suddenly the 
one carrying the rock was going to aim at me when I stood 
up. He was surprised. I told him not to kill me because I 
was an informer and was taken there by mistake. However, 
he still used the gun butt to hit my head and fractured it. 
They then took me inside the hospital where there were 
already so many women. I was the only man in that 
particular room. They told me they had all been raped. 
After two months in the hospital, I was forced to sign a 
statement to work as an informer which I did in order to 
save my life. 
Myself and Joao Antonio Dias fled our country because 
in the Jast few months, Indonesian security forces have 
orchestrated another terror campaign of assassination. Using 
stlencers, Indonesian security elements are assassinating 
young East Timorese in dark alleys. 
We appeal to the Commission to send investigation 
missions to East Timor. This is the least it can do. l} 
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'Death of a Nation' exposes grand conspiracy 
John Pilger, a leading documentary film-maker, has produced a "!ajor film .on E~st Timor ~hich has 
been shown to wide acclaim on British and Dutch television and m Australian cinemas. It is soon to 
be shown in many countries around the world. 
Much of the film, Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspir-
acy, was shot in East Timor when John Pilger and his 
producer David Munro, visited the country for three weeks 
in mid-i993. Two other members of the team aJso gained 
entry without being detected. One was Max Stahl, the 
cameraman whose footage of the November 1991 massacre 
caused an international outcry when Yorkshire TV's film, In 
Cold Blood, was screened in January 1992. 
Pilger and Munro entered East Timor posing as travel 
agents and managed to film extensively without the occu-
pation authorities realising who they were or what they 
were doing. Stahl, travelling separately, investigate the fate 
of survivors of the Santa Cruz massacre and collected testi-
mony about the second massacre. His witnesses later left 
East Timor and spoke at the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion in Geneva. [See separate item.] Stahl also interviewed 
the leader of the armed resistance, Konis Santana in the 
bush. 
Death of a Nation gives a history of Indonesia's seizure of 
East Timor as told by East Timorese and others connected 
in some way with the tragedy. Among those in a privile~ed 
position to know was Richard Woolcott, the Austraban 
ambassador to Indonesia in 1974 and 1975, as his country 
gave the go-ahead to Suharto. He told Pilger: 'I would 
agree with you that... the East Timorese were probably seen 
as expendable by some of the hard-nosed major power-
brokers if you like.' No wonder that, as he unashamedly 
recounted Australia's betrayal, an East Timorese at a 
showing of the film in the National Film Theatre in London 
started shouting and cursing. 
Another witness of the betrayal interviewed by Pilger is 
Philip Leighty, the senior CIA officer in Indonesia in 1975: 
' ... what I saw in Indonesia was that my own government 
was very much involved in what was going on in East 
Timor and that what was going on was not good. You can 
be one hundred per cent certain that Suharto was given the 
green light to do what he did.' 
Later, Pilger interviewed Indonesia~s ambassador to the 
UN in New York, Nugroho Wisnumurti who accused 
Amnesty of lying about torture and executions in East 
Timor. Again the Timorese in the audience could not 
contain his anger and screamed: 'Liar! Liar!' 
Hawk aircraft in action 
Pilger spoke to several · Timorese who saw UK-made Hawk 
combat aircraft in action in East Timor in the 1980s. 
Confronted with this evidence, a British armed forces 
minister claimed that 'we have guarantees from the 
Indonesians that they would not be used for internal 
suppression'. But Alan Clark, Britain's defence procurement 
minister in the early 1990s when the most recent Hawk deal 
was negotiated, told Pilger: 'A guarantee is worthless from 
any government as far as I'm concerned. I wouldn't even 
bother with it.' 
Pilger's film is a moving and forceful indictment of 
western complicity in Indonesia's evil colonisat~on of a tiny, 
peace-loving neighbour, invaluable ~or campaigners. 
Besides the television version which runs for about 70 
minutes a 90-minute version for screening in cinemas is 
also av;ilable which will be shown widely in Australia and 
the USA. Make inquiries with TV channels about showing 
the Pilger film in your country. . 
Address inquiries about contracts to Central Productmns, 
46 Charlotte St, London WlP lLX (fax: +44-71 580-7780) 
and to John Pilger, 57 Hambalt Road, London SW4 9EQ. 
Recent coverage in the UK about Timor 
Many Jong articJes appeared in the British press aro~nd the 
time Pilger's film was shown. To counter. the ~ilm's ~pa~t, 
the Indonesian government invited foreign 1ournahsts m 
Jakarta to visit East Timor in February. Their reports must 
have dismayed the government. Here are a few extracts: 
The BBC's Catherine Napier 
These extracts are from a report transmitted by the BBC 
World Service on 21 February: 
'I had to feel sorry for the man from the Foreign Ministry 
who was assigned the unhappy task of accompanying us to 
Dili .... The first morning in Dili, I got up early and went to 
fmd the cemetery where troops shot dead protesters in 
November 1991. The sun shone off the gravestones ... but 
the tranquillity was disturbed by rapid footsteps from 
behind. A hand came across my camera lens and I was 
firmly asked to ]eave. 
'We were often reminded on our travels to tell the truth 
about East Timor. But then the truth seemed out of reach. 
On a visit to the prison we were urged not to record or 
photograph or film or even talk to any prisoners. But as we 
walked across the prison yard, three men behind a wire 
fence shouted out, "Long live East Timor", then in English, 
"We want to talk to you." They were politicaJ prisoners 
from the Dili protest. And for a moment we were pulled in 
two directions until reminded of the deal we'd all signed up 
to.' 
Jeremy Wagstaff of Reuter 
'Foreign journalists allowed to visit the former Portuguese 
colony for the first time in nine months witnessed a capita] 
superficially normal but where paradoxes continue. From 
the plain-clothes security officers posing as waiters in Dili's 
Turismo Hotel to the well-dressed students accosting jour-
nalists in the street outside, not aJl the city's 132,000 people 
are what they seem. 
'An unconfirmed report - that up to 200 people were 
killed in the aftermath of an admitted November 1991 army 
massacre in Dili - has further muddied the waters. Officials 
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deny the report but some residents say it is true. "We have 
long known it to be true but so many people simply 
disappeared after November 12 it is impossible for us to 
know who died, where, when and how," said one 17-year-
old student who said he was present during the first 
massacre .... Young Timorese claiming to be sympathisers of 
Fretilin told journalists that at least 200 people died during 
the second massacre.' 
The London Spectator 
From an article, 'The Pol Pot of East Timo~' by Edward 
Theberton in the London weekly, Spectator. on 17.2.1994: 
'Alighting from the aircraft at Dili, one sense immediately 
the dead hand of totalitarianism. An eerie stillness reigns. 
Ten photographers, one with a video camera, took my 
picture before I reached the terminal building .... No sooner 
had I walked out into the streets than a goon on a motor-
cycle foJJowed me like a kerb-crawler in search of a 
prostitute. I stared into his dark glasses and turned to walk 
in the opposite direction. Disregarding the one-way system, 
he turned to foJJow me, making no effort to disguise the 
fact. ... 
' ... a young man said to me out of the comer of his mouth: 
"You must be very careful. There are many spies. I am a 
Timorese worker's mysterious death 
On 29 January 1994, the body of Petrus Tomae, an East 
Timorese worker, 32 years of age, who was employed by 
Indocement Citeureup, Bogor, was discovered in the River 
Citeureup. There is evidence that Petrus died after being 
tortured. According to an autopsy (No. P.02/040/I/1994) by 
a doctor on 3 February, the dead man was found to have 
haemorrhage in the brain, a fractured skuJJ and a broken 
bone in the nape of his neck. 
The East Timorese Families' Association (IKTT) at the 
factory wrote to the company and the police asking for his 
death to be investigated. The Indonesian Legal Aid Foun-
dation (YLBHI) has written to the chief of police about the 
case but has not yet received a response. The company 
failed to provide any death aJJowance as they normaJJy do. 
Other East Timorese working at the factory feel threatened 
by the circumstances in which Petrus died. 
But on 24 February, as a result of IKTT's complaint, the 
33 East Timorese working at the factory were summoned 
by Lieut.General Supardjo, Personnel Director, who told 
them to withdraw · their complaint withiri 24 hours and 
threatened them with dismissal. 
Petrus had worked for Indocement since 1991; the 
company is owned by Sudwikatmono [a step-brother of 
President Suharto] and Liem Sioe Liong [Indonesia's 
foremost business tycoon and a close associate of the 
President). He was recruited by Yayasan Tiara, a company 
owned by Siti Hardiyanti [the President's oldest daughter]. 
Petrus was one of 34 East Timorese recruited at the time. 
The day before he was found dead, he had invited two 
friends to his home, saying that he was expected someone 
to come. The dead man was last seen alive by his wife at 
3.30am on 28 January when they were about to leave home 
to go to Bogor. But as Petrus was Jocking the front door, he 
suddenly rushed from the house as if he was being chased 
by someone. [source LBH]. 
r:rn "A cT·· · 7"Ta:1 n n i ~·~·.·.. :l.11Y.l. V L\. 
spy." "'Why are you a spy?" I asked. "I am a student and I 
attended a meeting, The Indonesians catched me. Then they 
tortured me. They Jet me go if I am a spy for them. After 
you leave me, I must tell them aJJ you say to me, why you 
are here and everything." l} 
Parliamentarians meet Boutros-Ghali 
. . Four members of Parliamen.tariizns for &st Tunor 
met UN :SecretarY.;.:GeneraJ Dr Boutros Bautr0s~hali 
in New Yoi'k '. on 3 February 1994 to discilss the 
question of ~t Timor. They were: Lord Avebury 
1 
··. (UK), Senator·John Daidis (Ire,and), Ingela Marten-
.. ·sson (Swed~n) •and John Langmore (Australia). 
·The mission .handed a Memo to the ·secretary-
General c3.lling ·for the · withdrawal of Indonesian 
I troops and thC holding of A referendum in East 
Tbnor. The MemQ also pni~d ·that . the UN set up 
··.· a; commission to study the ·t(VCn~Jeading to Indone-
sia's l:nvasion arid annexatfon of the territofy; : · • 
.·.•.· Dt Boutros.:.-Obali said he would consider the idea 
but felt it might be seen as. 1c0nfrontational'. 
I . ·· . 
Jailed for giving Xanana refuge 
Agusto Pereira, an East Timorese member of the Indonesian 
police force, was given 18 months for sheltering the East 
Timor resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, in his home in 
Dili over a period of three years. Xanana was arrested in 
Pereira's home on 20 November 1992. The sentence, was 
passed by a military court in Dili. [Merdeka, 17.2.1994) 
Giant statue of Christ unpopular 
A giant statue of Jesus Christ, to be unveiled later this year 
atop a rocky cape 6 km east of Dili, has failed to excite the 
local Catholic community, according to the Jakarta-based 
Indonesian Observer. Standing 17 metres high to reflect 
East Timor's annexation by Indonesia on 17 July 1976, and 
placed on a ten-metre high pedestal, it is expected to be 
visible for many kilometres. The 27-metre height is 
intended to reflect East Timor's status as Indonesia's '27th 
province'. 
But the $500,000 statue, paid for by Indonesia's national 
airline, Garuda and the East Timor government has made 
little impression on local people, religious sources said. The 
blessing of its cornerstone in the presence of governor 
Abilio Soares drew only 200 .people. By contrast, 10,000 
people turned out for the inauguration a month earlier of a 
much smaJJer statue of Christ in the mountain region of 
Matebian. Bishop Belo who is highly popular among the 
East Timorese presided over the Matebian ceremony. 
The statue of Christ near Dili is intended to symbolise 
Jakarta's desire to recognise East Tim.or's Christian charac-
ter, even as thousands of mainly Muslim Indonesian 
soldiers remain stationed in the territory. [Indonesian 
Observer, 17.2.1994) l} 
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TAPOL NEEDS YOUR HELP NOW! 
WE ARE NOT GOING BUST BUT WE NEED FUNDS NOW 
TO CONTINUE OUR MONITORING AND CAMPAIGNING 
Recently, Indonesia has been in the press almost daily, following John Pilger's film, 'Death of a Nation - The Timor 
Conspiracy' shown on UK Television in February 1994. Immediately after the film was shown British Telecom reported 4000 
calls a minute to the number shown at the end of the film. The Foreign Office has been inundated with letters of concern. 
The international community is being alerted to the complicity of the US, Britain and Australia in the takeover of East Timor 
because Pilger's film has been sold to, and is due to be broadcast in thirty countries worldwide. 
Journalists from the quality press in Britain have published indepth investigations into links between the British and Indonesian 
military-industrial-complexes. The plight of East Timor as weJJ as the Indonesians governments' system of human rights abuses 
were covered in articles in many leading daily papers and weekly journals in Britain and elsewhere. 
TAPOL, an information resource centre on abuses in East Timor, West Papua, Aceh, and in Indonesia proper, is honoured to 
have been in the position of helping these journalists with their research in alerting world opinion about the abuses committed 
by one of the world's most oppressive regimes. Right now TAPOL urgently needs help to continue and intensify our work. 
YES I WANT TO HELP TAPOLTO CONTINUE ITS URGENT WORK 
To subscribers : Please make EITHER a one-off donation OR take out a standing order to support us 
To other readers: Please become a subscriber OR make a donation OR take out a standing order 
Yes, I would like to donate [] £500 [ ]£250 [ ]£100 [ ]£50 [ ]£25 [ ]£10 other£ __ _ 
METHOD OF PAYMENT 
(a) I enclose a total of£ _____ (cash, cheques/postal order payable to TAPOL UK Campaign) 
(b) or, I WOULD LIKE TO PAY MY SUBSCRIPTION/DONATION BY STANDING ORDER (UK only) 
Name and address of your bank/building society (in capitals please) 
To The Manager 
----------------- Bank/Building Society 
Please pay to TAPOL UK Campaign (account no. 50875805) 
Barclays. 23 Euston Road, London NW1 2SB (20-46-52) the sum of 
£ ____ (minimum £5) starting on the 1st QR 14th day of ______ 199 
and monthly/quarterly/annually until further notice. 
Signed ____________________ Date _______ _ 
Account Holder/s Account no. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- ---------(As shown in your cheque/Pass book) 
Your name and address(in CAPIT~ please). ________________ _ 
NOTE: Please send the above to TAPOL and NOT to your bank. 
